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Introduction 
On 1 January 2015, a new international organisation was launched in the post-Soviet space, 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Building on the previous integration efforts of 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the formation of an economic union signalled the 
advancement of the integration agenda and was described as ‘epoch-making’ by its political 
‘godfathers’.1 This ‘deepening’ of integration was to be accompanied by improved 
institutions, including the drafting of a comprehensive Treaty to raise the effectiveness of 
integration.  
That such an ‘improvement’ would (and even should) strengthen the supranational nature of 
the project was a reasonable assumption. Firstly, in comparative regional integration terms, 
moves towards ‘deep’ integration have been associated with ‘high’ institutionalisation and 
legalization of cooperative efforts, including the corresponding handover of sovereignty to 
common bodies.2 The introduction of EU-style juridicised forms of dispute resolution, in 
particular, has been found to correlate with the proposed depth of integration.3 Secondly, the 
institutional design of previous post-Soviet integration regimes already charted a progressive 
and deliberate course towards the adoption of EU-style supranational features.4 The 
emulation of such institutional templates was motivated by the fact that, despite its 
deficiencies, the EU was seen as the only successfully functioning model for deep integration, 
one built upon ‘objective principles’ transferable across borders.5 Thirdly, criticisms of the 
early Eurasian regime pointed consistently to the need for a more coherent and expanded 
																																								 																				
1 ‘Putin: Peredacha polnomochii v EAES ne oznachaet utratu suvereniteta’, RIA Novosti, 29 May 2014,  
http://ria.ru/economy/20140529/1009842639.html 
2 Whilst this is a complex and much debated issue, many have argued that depth of integration and legality are 
positively correlated. For an overview, see K. Raustiala (2005) ‘Form and Substance in international 
Agreements’, 99 The American Journal of International Law 581-614. Despite the fact that the terms 
‘institutionalisation’ and ‘legalisation’ can have somewhat different connotations in international law and 
international relation discourses, here they are used synonymously. They are understood as concepts to describe 
a continuum of possible institutional design, with the ‘high’ end of the spectrum associated with EU-style 
supranational transfer of sovereignty to a common organisation, e.g. K. Abbott et al. (2000) ‘The Concept of 
Legalization’, 54:3 International Organisation 401-419.    
3 J. McCall Smith (2000) ‘The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade 
Pacts’, 54:1 International Organization 137-180. 
4 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (2015) ‘EU Emulation in the Design of Eurasian Integration’, in D. Lane and V. 
Samokhvalov, eds. The Eurasian Project and Europe: Regional Discontinuities and Geopolitics (Routledge). 
5 T. Valovaya (2012) ‘Eurasian Economic Integration: Origins, Patterns, and Outlooks’, EDB Eurasian 
Integration Yearbook 42-61; V. Gustov (2008) Na puti k sozdaniiu tamozhennogo soiuza Evraziiskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soobshcjestva’, Evraziiskaia Integratsiia: Ekonomika, Pravo, Politika, No. 3, 19-23. 
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common regulation. Importantly, many of the predictions about the potential benefits of 
Eurasian integration were premised on issues, such as the removal of non-tariff barriers as 
key obstacles to internal trade.6 Such extensive regulatory harmonisation agenda, however, is 
conditional on effective regulatory institutions and robust guarantees for domestic 
implementation, something found to be problematic in the Eurasian context. Finally, the 
narrative about the importance of transfer of sovereignty in the context of the EAEU was 
emphasised by the project political leaders in their dealings on the international stage. Vis-à-
vis the European Union, for example, it was underlined that sovereignty was transferred to 
the institutions of the EAEU in a supranational fashion with the implication that trade 
relations should be regulated not at bilateral but at inter-bloc level.7 The same position was 
followed in the context of Kazakhstan’s WTO accession, where its undertakings are to be 
implemented by domestic but also EAEU bodies.8 
What the Treaty on the EAEU adopted on 29 May 2014 delivered in terms of institutional 
design,9 however, suggests that the deepening of economic integration was not accompanied 
by a clear consolidation of the level of pre-existing institutionalisation or its expansion. As 
early commentators pointed out, the Treaty was weak ‘from an international, legal and 
constitutional point of view’.10 In particular, despite the welcome codification of the legal 
basis of integration, the Treaty on the EAEU reversed the trend towards high 
institutionalisation, strengthening the protection of state sovereignty in line with traditional, 
intergovernmental patterns of inter-state relations. Indeed, in the context of awakened 
sovereignty sensitivities, political leaders, such as the Kazakh President, were keen to 
underline that the new Treaty ‘entirely excludes any kind of limitation or violation of Kazakh 
sovereignty. We have provided mechanisms excluding limitations or violation of our 
sovereignty at all levels.’11  
This development presents an empirical and analytical puzzle in terms of the resulting 
balance between integration objectives and the institutional framework for their achievement. 
Certainly, this balance is sufficiently precarious and opaque, allowing for different 
interpretations to be communicated to different political audiences. The implications are 
extremely important in terms of the need to clarify the domestic, and particularly 
constitutional, implications of membership in the EAEU. Scrutinising the balance between 
																																								 																				
6 E.g. D. Tarr (2016) ‘The Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and the Kyrgyz 
Republic: Can it Succeed where its Predecessors Failed?’, 54:1 East European Economics 1-22.  
7 See, for example, the statement of Russia’s Deputy- Prime Minister Shuvalov following the signing of the 
Treaty, ‘Obshchee ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo s Evropoi teper’ vozmozhno lish’ v formate ES-EAES  -
Shuvalov’, Vedomosti, 30 May 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/print/2014/05/30/27183511. Similarly, 
‘Evraziiskii soiuz predlagaet ES nachat’ dialog o sozdanii oshchego ekonomicheskogo prostranstva’, TASS, 26 
October 2015, http://tass.ru/ekonomika/2380019. 
8 WTO, ‘Overview of Kazakhstan’s Commitments’, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/kazakhannex_e.pdf. Kazakhstan became formally a member of 
the WTO on 30 November 2015. 
9 The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on 29 May 2014 
and entered into force on 1 January 2015.  
10 P. Kalinichenko (2015) ‘The Eurasian ‘Bewitchery’ of the Astana Treaty’, The Intersection Project, 8 August 
2015, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-euroep/eurasian-bewitchery-astana-treaty. 
11 ‘Dogovor o sozdanii EAES zakonodatel’no iskliuchaet narushenie suvereniteta – Miniust RK’, Tenge, 26 May 
2014, http://tenge.me/?p=9546.  
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the form and substance of integration is also vital in assessing the viability of the EAEU 
regime and its institutional determinants. Yet, while the policy interest in the EAEU has been 
massive, the academic analysis of its legal aspects is in its infancy.12    
In addressing this puzzle and filling an important gap in the literature, this chapter examines 
the degree to which the formal setup of the EAEU entails a limitation or transfer of its 
member states’ sovereignty to the common integration framework. Drawing on international 
organizations’ analysis, the chapter starts by identifying a set of formal criteria to capture the 
key limits imposed by sovereignty on the transfer of state power to such organisations. The 
discussion then proceeds to provide an overview of the circumstances around the adoption of 
the EAEU Treaty, situating it against the background of previous integration efforts and key 
aspects of the wider regional context affecting member states’ preferences in relation to 
integration-sovereignty trade-offs. Given the fluid and complex narratives accompanying the 
launch of the EAEU, the analysis also draws on the drafting history of the Treaty.13 Even 
though Armenia’s membership was also actively negotiated during the spring of 2014, the 
EAEU Treaty was very much the product of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, with Armenia’s 
place defined as a country ‘acceding’ to this Treaty.14 This was the same with the Kyrgyz 
Republic, which followed suit in joining the EAEU.15 That is why here only the negotiating 
position of the three founding countries will be considered. Applying the formal criteria 
identified, the next four sections seek to discuss the extent to which the design of the EAEU 
calls for the members’ sovereignty transfer and how the imposed limits to such transfer 
compare with the provisions of previous regimes. In conclusion, the chapter offers some 
explanations for the observed trajectory and discusses its potential implications.    
Conceptualising the limits on sovereignty 
International organisations are frequently classified as ‘intergovernmental’ or 
‘supranational’.16 The conceptualisation of these labels in the literature has not entailed a 
universally accepted, bright-line definition. While the EU tends to exemplify the most 
‘supranational’, highly institutionalised end of the spectrum, it is recognised that all 
organisations entail some erosion of absolute state sovereignty, with member states 
voluntarily granting powers for the purposes of achieving the organisation’s objectives. This 
																																								 																				
12 See, for example, E. Bail’dinov (2014) ‘Dogovor o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom soiuze: shag vpered, dva 
shaga nazad’, Evraziiskii iuridicheskii zhurnal Nr. 10(77), 25-33; M. Karliuk (2015) ‘The Eurasian Economic 
Union: an EU-like Legal Order in the Post-Soviet Space?’ HSE Working Paper BPR/LAW/2015; Zh. Kembayev 
(2016) ‘Sravnitel’no –pravovoi analiz funktsionirovaniia Suda Evraziiskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soiuza’ 2:18 
Mezhdunarodnoe pravosudie 30-45. 
13 Two drafts of the Treaty are used in particular. The first one was posted by the Kazakh side on 10 September 
2013, http://kazenergy.com/ru/2012-09-05-04-11-04/2011-05-13-18-20-44/10777-2013-09-10-07-03-15.html. 
The second draft, dated 30 January 2014 and containing the comments, proposals and reservations of the three 
member state, was posted also by the Kazakh side, //palata.kz/ru/news/3129, followed by a publication on the 
web-site of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development on 12 February 2014, 
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/about/structure/depSNG/doc20140212_1. Information is also drawn from 
conversations with senior officials of the Eurasian Economic Commission and interviews reported in the press.  
14 Armenia signed an accession treaty on 10 October 2014, which entered into force on 2 January 2015.  
15 The Kyrgyz Republic signed an accession treaty on 23 December 2014, coming into force on 12 August 2015. 
16 E.g. J.H.H. Weiler (1982) Supranational Law and the Supranational System, PhD Thesis, EUI, Florence, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/4822; H. Schermers and N. Blokker (2001) International Institutional Law, 
3rd ed. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London, Boston). 
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erosion tends to be revealed in a range of ‘mixed’ characteristics with many organisations 
proving to represent hybrid types. Nonetheless, these categories remain helpful for the 
analysis of the EAEU, particularly when the focus of analysis is placed on the dynamic mix 
of different limits (material as well as temporal) imposed by sovereignty on the transfer of 
state power from the state to the international organisation, delineated in the latter’s 
constitutive treaties.17  
First, such limits are reflected in the type of competences granted to an organization. As 
observed by Martin Martinez, unlike supranational organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations have concurrent instead of exclusive competences, which tend to be exclusively 
listed in constitutive treaties and limited to a restricted set of substantive areas.18  
Second, the degree of independence of the organisation’s internal bodies is highly indicative 
of the limits on sovereignty. Intergovernmental organisations may have common bodies, but 
they are not independent of the member states, particularly of their executive branches.19 
Notably, governments cannot be bound against their will and any binding decisions require 
unanimity. In supranational organisations, common bodies exhibit high independence from 
member states – in terms of their composition, but more importantly, in terms of their 
decision-making powers. Critically, independent bodies can adopt decisions by majority vote, 
thereby biding some member states against their will.  
Third, sovereignty can also be limited by the development of a body of common law within 
an organisation. Establishing the autonomous nature of such an order in international 
organisations can be complex.20 The EU’s model has underscored the ability of the 
organization to enact binding decisions directly applicable to member states and its citizens.21 
Thus, the acts adopted by the common bodies of a supranational organization, unlike 
international law proper, require no ratification or the application of another domestic 
procedure for its entry into the domestic legal order or its supremacy over contradictory 
domestic norms. In this sense, the state is bound a priori, regardless of the particular decision 
at stake and without the possibility to control its entry into the domestic legal order.  
Fourth, often the most visible limit on sovereignty relates to the availability of disciplinary 
and enforcement mechanisms, allowing a member state to be compelled to comply with the 
decision of the common bodies, even if it opposes it. Supranational organizations like the EU 
vest extensive disciplinary powers with its permanent regulator, the European Commission, 
as well as binding dispute resolution powers with its Court. In intergovernmental 
organisations states’ compliance is encouraged primarily through diplomatic means and peer-
pressure.  
																																								 																				
17 M. Martin Martinez (1996) National Sovereignty and International Organizations (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague/Boston/London). 
18 Ibid, at 72. 
19 Schermers and Blokker, op.cit. note 16. 
20 M. Sørensen (1983) ‘Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of 
International Organisations in the World Legal Order’, 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 559–576. 
21 Weiler, op.cit. note 16. 
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The above list is not necessarily exhaustive, but captures the most salient limits on the 
transfer of sovereignty. Importantly, as Martin Martinez points out, the imposed limits are 
rarely static, but tend to change over time.22 Such a dynamic perspective is particularly suited 
to the analysis of the EAEU, and Eurasian integration frameworks more generally, 
characterised by path dependence, recurrent sovereignty sensitivities as well as frequent 
changes in design.23 While the Eurasian Economic Union has been in existence for a very 
short time and the observations on its institutional practices are still limited, it builds on 
several preceding initiatives. For this reason, it is important to situate it in its historical and 
regional context.  
Institutional and historical background of the EAEU 
The EAEU is a new international organisation in the post-Soviet world, launched following 
the adoption of its founding Treaty. Yet, its genesis and institutional design cannot be 
understood without tracing its roots within previous integration efforts in the region. In fact, 
the EAEU inherited an already developed regime and is best conceptualised in terms of its 
‘constitutionalisation’ and modification. Thus, the drafting of the new Treaty was an 
opportunity to organise and improve the pre-existing framework. At the same time, the new 
round of bargaining allowed member states to revisit the terms of integration in line with their 
evolving priorities and the changing geopolitical context. 
The EAEU was set up on the basis of the Customs Union (CU) and Single Economic Space 
(SES) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. After a quick inception, including the 
drafting of a package of constitutive agreements, the CU was launched in June 2010. It was 
envisaged as a treaty regime within an existing organisation, the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC).24 This formula allowed a core of ‘willing partners’ to move fast 
towards more advanced forms of integration by upgrading and supplementing the EurAsEC 
regime. Importantly, as will be illustrated in the subsequent discussion, this commitment had 
a certain novelty to it in providing for an improved institutional framework to enable effective 
integration. In doing so, the supranational templates of the EU, viewed as the most successful 
example of ‘deep’ integration, provided inspiration for institutional design and signalled some 
in-roads into limiting sovereignty to achieve the objectives set.25  
At the same time, given the incremental and selective nature of the design process, the 
resulting Customs Union regime exhibited important gaps.26 The addition of a large number 
of new agreements led to a cumbersome and complex web of regulation, characterised by 
complex cross-references and inconsistencies. These faults were exacerbated by the fast speed 
of the developing integration agenda, allowing little time for careful drafting or attention to 
																																								 																				
22 Martin Matinez, op.cit. note 17. 
23 R. Dragneva (2013) ‘The Legal and Institutional Dimensions of the Eurasian Customs Union’, in Dragneva, 
R. and Wolczuk, K. (2013) Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham). 
24 The Eurasian Economic Community was set up in October 2000 and united Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its set up drew on a previous set of agreements and integration bodies between those 
countries, Dragneva, op. cit. note 23.  
25 Valovaya, op.cit. note 5. 
26 Dragneva, op. cit. note 23. 
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domestic implementation. In 2012, the CU was transformed into a SES by adding another set 
of agreements and implementing a partial institutional reform, including the creation of a new 
permanent regulator with enhanced powers, the Eurasian Economic Commission. At the same 
time, the transition to a Eurasian Union was already contemplated in December 2010 with the 
process accelerating fast, as will be discussed below.27 
The design of the Customs Union and SES exhibited one other very important shortcoming: 
its legal status. Being a treaty regime, the CU did not have a separate legal personality. Thus, 
for example, following Russia’s accession to the WTO in August 2012, the Eurasian 
institutions were in charge of implementing important undertakings, in particular, Russia’s 
tariff reduction schedule. Yet, those institutions had no representative powers before the 
WTO. Similarly, it was clear that ‘actorness’ on the global stage, including the international 
legal personality behind it, was particularly prized by the Kremlin. President Putin made no 
secret of his ambitions about Eurasian integration as a constitutive part of a new multipolar 
world and an equal partner of the EU.28 This was also important in terms of the planned 
widening of the Eurasian project. In particular, serious overtures to solicit the membership of 
Ukraine were made as of the spring of 2011; these were followed by talks with Kyrgyzstan, 
the partner of the Customs Union trio in the EurAsEC, with whom formal accession talks 
were started in October 2011. 
The terms and outlines of the proposed Eurasian Union were initially set out in a draft 
Decision of the Commission of the CU of May 2011. This document exposed some of the 
clear differences in the country’s views on further integration: Kazakhstan preferred a purely 
economic integration framework, yet one falling short of a currency union, whereas Russia 
viewed the project as a pathway to a fully-fledged union, including cooperation in defence, 
border management and foreign policy. As Cooper points out, Kazakhstan had major 
reservations to calling the new entity a ‘union’, preferring the name ‘single economic space’ 
instead.29The following months were key in putting the project in motion and agreeing on 
some of its fundamentals. Much is owed to the drive of Vladimir Putin and the priority given 
to the Eurasian project in the context of his bid for a third presidency. The broad consensus 
reached was reflected in the Declaration on the Eurasian Economic Integration adopted by the 
countries’ Heads of State on 18 November 2011, which launched the SES but also announced 
the intention to create a Eurasian Economic Union. The document provided little detail, yet it 
was telling of the compromises that had already taken place by defining the project in 
primarily economic terms, while retaining the name ‘union’. Critically, it was decided that 
such a union will be based on the codification of the legal basis of the Customs Union and 
SES to be completed by 1 January 2015. To this deadline, another was added soon: that a 
																																								 																				
27 J. Cooper (2013) ‘The Development of Eurasian Economic Integration’, in Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. 
(2013) Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham). The idea of the 
Union is traditionally attributed to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, presented in a speech at 
the Moscow State University on 29 March 1994. The focus here, however, is on the practical incarnation of the 
initiative within the Eurasian integration project.  
28 V. Putin, ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii – budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia’, Izvestiia, 4 
October 2011. Notably, the value of international legal personality of integration platforms was also exhibited at 
the founding of the EurAsEC back in 2000, Dragneva and Wolczuk, op.cit. note 4. 
29 Cooper, op.cit. note 27, at 29. 
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draft treaty on the EAEU be prepared by 1 May 2014.30 This ambitious time-scale was clearly 
driven by the Russian side, with President Putin initially referring even to a launch in 2013.31 
Following this decision, the preparation for the planned codification and new Treaty 
progressed at a fast pace. The draft, leaked by the Kazakh side in September 2013,32 revealed 
that a highly ‘unionist’ concept was initially developed, as the following analysis will 
demonstrate, including a parliamentary body, the Eurasian Inter-parliamentary Assembly. 
These proposals met a strong opposition, particularly in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh position 
reflected its underlying preferences for a purely economic agenda expressed previously, but 
also its concerns over the running of the integration process. Significantly, the Council of 
Heads of State of 24 October 2013 became a platform for unprecedentedly open criticism of 
Russia’s dominance over the project, as will be discussed later.  
The result was a significantly trimmed down revised draft, made public in the beginning of 
February 2014. The draft retracted many of the previous features, including the planned 
parliamentary assembly, and reflected the reassurances sought to maintain the purely 
economic nature of the organisation as well as guarantee the equality of member states.33 
Nonetheless, a range of difficult issues remained, as revealed in the intense negotiations over 
the spring 2014 in the rush to meet the agreed deadline of 1 May 2014.  
Critically, this process was overtaken by the political developments in Ukraine, resulting in a 
popular revolt, the collapse of President Yanukovich’s regime and the formation of a new 
government at the end of February 2014. Although Belarus and Kazakhstan allied behind 
Russia in its reaction to the Ukrainian events, some differences emerged. Importantly, as the 
expedited on President Nazarbayev’s insistence summit of the heads of state on 5 March 
revealed, Kremlin’s partners Lukashenka and Nazarbayev were concerned about Russia’s 
lack of consultation and the military build-up in the Crimean region.34 The following 
annexation of Crimea, formally supported or at least not publicly challenged, and the ethnic 
zeal it unleashed in Russia, however, clearly unsettled countries like Kazakhstan with large 
Russian minorities and reawakened sovereignty concerns.35  
These developments, it can be argued, affected the negotiating context. Speaking soon after 
the annexation, the Kazakh President was keen to emphasise that ‘[As] far as our 
independence is concerned, it is a constant. Kazakhstan will not surrender to anybody even an 
iota of its independence. But some economic prerogatives we will transfer voluntarily to 
																																								 																				
30 Decision Nr 21 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 19 December 2012.  
31 N. Buckley, ‘Putin sets sight on Eurasian economic union’, Financial Times, 16 April 2011. 
32 http://kazenergy.com/ru/2012-09-05-04-11-04/2011-05-13-18-20-44/10777-2013-09-10-07-03-15.html 
33 http://palata.kz/ru/news/3129. 
34 A .Klasikovskii, ‘Putin vsypal Kievu, a zatylok cheshut I v Minske’, Naviny, 5 March 2015, 
http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2014/03/05/ic_articles_112_184790; N. Hayrumyan, ‘Integration talks amid 
Ukraine crisis: Leaders of Customs Union member states meeting in Moscow’, ArmeniaNow.com, 
https://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/52454/armenia_customs_union_russia_membership_kazak
hstan_belarus_lukashenko_nazarbayev 
35 ‘Russia-Ukraine Crisis Alarms Central Asian Strongmen’, EurasiaNet.org, 4 March 2014, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68104. D. Solovyov, ‘As Kiev looks West, Putin turns east to build Eurasian 




supranational organs’.36 Importantly, the Kazakh side became more determined to ensure that 
such transfer remains ‘voluntary’ and conditional on member states’ consensus, insisting on 
explicit guarantees to assert sovereignty and appease domestic sensitivities.  
Recognising Belarus’s high dependence on Russia, President Lukashenka was more prepared 
to accept limitations of sovereignty.37 As he famously put it, ‘sovereignty is not an icon one 
needs to pray before’.38 He was determined, however, to get a better price for its sacrifice, 
slowing down the Treaty completion marathon in order to achieve it. The negotiations 
focused on seeking to secure a free trade with no exemptions, including tariffs on energy, 
culminating in an ultimatum issued in late April that Belarus might not sign with the 
satisfactory resolution of the issue. The strategy delivered only partial results, i.e. a time-table 
for removal of exemptions rather than immediate free trade terms, yet the financial package 
attached to them was sufficient to secure Lukashenka’s support for the final run-up now 
planned for the end of May.39 While it was these tensions that captured the headlines, behind 
the stage the push for greater intergovernmentalism in the final version of the treaty 
continued, as will be illustrated in the discussion below.  
Competences 
Regional organisations in the post-Soviet space have tended to have wide and far-reaching, 
yet not necessarily clearly specified objectives. The CIS sought to promote cooperation in an 
open-ended range of areas: from the economy to various aspects of culture and social life. 
Yet, the tasks of the organisation were always limited to promoting cooperation with member 
states in the lead. The latters’ participation in any of these platforms was always selective, 
frequently subject to extensive reservations, and revocable.40 The EurAsEC was similarly 
designed with an ambitious agenda in mind, starting with a customs union, yet in terms of 
decision-making practices, it never moved beyond being a framework for discussion and 
broad cooperation.41  
The Customs Union launched in 2010 represented a break in this pattern in so far as it had 
clearly defined objectives with competences in the area of customs regulation vested with the 
common bodies of integration, particularly its permanent regulator. The resulting regime was 
one of partial attribution of powers, with some issues vested with CU authorities, but others 
requiring the action of national bodies. For example, a main criticism of the Code of the 
																																								 																				
36 ‘N. Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan ne otdast ni iotu nezavisimosti komu by to ni bylo’, Zakon.Kz, 25 March 2014, 
http://www.zakon.kz/4611637-n.nazarbaev-kazakhstan-ne-otdast-ni.html. 
37 M. Frear (2013) ‘Belarus: Player and Pawn in the Integration Game’, in Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2013) 
Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (ward Elgar, Cheltenham). 
38 ‘Suverenitet ne ikona’, Gazeta.Ru, 24 October 2013, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/10/24/5722545.shtml. 
39 ‘Moskva nal’et Belarusi polstakana v dolg’, Naviny, 9 May 2014, 
http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2014/05/09/ic_articles_113_185443. 
40 R. Dragneva (2004) ‘Is ‘Soft’ Beautiful?: Another View on Law, Institutions and Integration in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States’, 29:3 RCEEL 279-324.  
41 M. Golovnin (2008) ‘Opportunities and Obstacles to EurAsEc Integration’, EDB Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook 2008, 38-53, http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/docs/a_n1_2008_12.pdf. Arguably, the most 
important contribution to integration was made by the Court of the EurAsEC, as will be discussed further below.  
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Customs Union was the large number of references to domestic law.42 Ultimately, the 
division of competences between CU and domestic institutions was problematic. In fact, one 
of the strongest grievances of the EU at the time was about this, including the instrumental 
use of the competence issue by Russia: often trade restrictions were initiated by domestic 
bodies, yet for their lifting, the trade partner was referred to the customs union institutions.43  
Being a treaty regime made it possible to easily add new objectives to the project. The most 
notable expansion of the scope of cooperation was the addition of the SES in 2012. While the 
goal of the SES was generally defined as the creation of a common market, in practice there 
was a package of 17 agreements dealing with different areas of cooperation (or aspects 
thereof in some cases), such as macroeconomic policy, competition, natural monopolies, 
movement of capital, public procurement, labour migration and statistics. The level of 
transfer of powers to the CU and SES bodies was very different across these areas. President 
Nazarbayev referred to the transfer of 175 national competences to the newly launched 
Eurasian Economic Commission.44 Yet, few of these competences were exclusive, 
particularly in view of the decision-making mechanism established, as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
The concept of the EAEU as a new, fully-fledged international organisation gave the 
opportunity to reconsider the objectives and scope of Eurasian integration. As discussed 
earlier, the compromise reached was for drafting a treaty on integration in purely economic 
matters. The scope of economic integration was to be delineated by the previously concluded 
agreements, which were to be codified. At the same time, there was much talk on the possible 
expansion of this scope, particularly in relation to a common currency. Yet, the association of 
a monetary union with a political union was too strong for Russia’s partners.45 Indeed, none 
of the drafts purported to define exhaustively the integration agenda, allowing for new areas 
of cooperation to be added by subsequent agreements. Similarly, it was clear that the 
leadership of Russia and Belarus remained amiable to integration spilling into areas of 
political and defence cooperation. This explains Kazakhstan’s insistence on including in the 
final draft the specific designation of the EAEU as an international organisation for ‘regional 
economic integration’.46 
To secure the achievement of its objectives, the September 2013 draft Treaty attempted to 
provide a clear division between Union and national competences. The proposal referred to 
exclusive Union competences in relation to the customs union, customs administration, 
external trade policy, competition, technical standards, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. 
																																								 																				
42 See, for example, V. Visloguzov, ‘Kodeks razdora’, Kommersant, 21 June 2010. 
43 Interviews with DG Trade officials (April 2014) and EU’s Trade Delegation in Moscow (November 2013 and 
March 2014). 
44 V. Osipov, ‘Evoliursiia evraziiskoi integratsii’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 1 January 2012, 
http://www.kazpravda.kz/archives/view/141430. 
45 While even a name for such a currency was floated, altyn, it was decided not to proceed in this direction at 
that point. Nevertheless, Russia clearly continues its effort to convert the EAEU into a monetary union, despite 
its partners’ reluctance. See, for example, A. Kim, ‘Common Currency for the Eurasian Economic Union: 
Testing the Ground?’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 27 March 2015, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43712&cHash=965d3d424fe932
5ed36b197d121ccf66#.VzgQ__krLIU. 
46 Article 1 (2) of the EAEU Treaty. 
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In relation to the areas falling within the SES agenda, the proposal was for a joint competence 
of the Union and the member states. Purely domestic competences in these matters were 
defined as residual: when envisaged in an international agreement or not regulated by Union 
legislation at all.47  
Despite the systematic clarity on this issue, this draft must have resembled too much the 
various versions for a Union Treaty to replace the USSR developed during 1991. 
Unsurprisingly, this was one of the areas of notable difference between the various drafts. 
The January version listed the areas of Union competence, leaving out the term ‘exclusive’ 
altogether. It also abandoned the term ‘joint’ competence. The result was a distinction 
between ‘coordinated (skoordinirovannuiu), harmonised (soglasovannuiu), and ‘when 
needed’, unified (edinuiu) policy in the areas determined by the treaty and other international 
agreements’.48  
The final Treaty, however, opted for a much opaque approach to this matter. Article 5 (1) 
stated that ‘[T]he Union is endowed with competences within the limits established by this 
treaty and other international agreements concluded within the Union.’ Thus, it retracted from 
spelling out clearly the areas of attributed competence, leaving those to be identified by what 
is a complex analysis of the Treaty, its voluminous appendices, and any other agreements that 
may be added subsequently. As one of the first analysts of the Treaty points out, ‘this task is 
made more difficult by the possibility for member states to introduce reservations or 
limitations in a range of areas’.49 As a consequence, the author concludes, the competence of 
the Union is ‘down to zero’ which will seriously impede the effective functioning of the 
Union.  
Article 5 (2) of the Treaty retains the reference to coordinated and harmonised policy, as 
defined in this Treaty and other agreements. Responding to the criticisms,50 the Treaty 
provided legal definitions for the two terms: ‘coordinated’ is defined as policy based on 
common approaches approved by the bodies of the Union, and ‘harmonised’ – as based on 
harmonised legal regulation, including by acts of the bodies, to the extent necessary for 
achieving the objectives of the union.51 On the basis of these definitions, however, it is 
extremely difficult to establish clearly the differences between the two types of policies. This 
is not just because of the unfortunate, hasty drafting. Confusingly, many policies were 
referred to as ‘coordinated (harmonised)’.52 It is also clear that the designation of cooperation 
in certain areas as ‘unified’ or ‘coordinated’ was of particular sensitivity in the drafting 
																																								 																				
47 Article 5 of the September 2013 draft. 
48 Article 5 of the September 2013 draft. 
49 Bail’dinov, op. cit. note 12. 
50 For example, see President Nazarbayev’s comments at the December 2013 summit, ‘Sochinitel’nyi Soiuz’, 
Gazeta.Ru, 24 December 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/12/24/5818017.shtml. 
51 Article 2 of the Treaty. 
52 E.g. Article 86 (Transport), Article 94 (Agricultural policy) 
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process, ultimately resulting in the near elimination of the term ‘unified’ and the higher 
number of ‘harmonised’ policies.53  
Delegation to common decision-making bodies  
In the past two decades, delegation to common bodies came to be seen as an important pre-
condition for successful integration in the post-Soviet space. This has been particularly so 
with regard to the expectations of an effective permanent regulator. On balance, while the 
design of the principal plenary, decision-making bodies of integration has been characterised 
by strong intergovernmental features, the design of the permanent regulator in successive 
post-Soviet integration projects demonstrated some inroads into limiting member states 
sovereignty. Yet, such limitations have never been without reservations.54 The EAEU 
reproduces this pattern, while also seeking to address some of the asymmetry concerns arisen 
in the previous years. 
As with its predecessors, the principal decision-making fora of the EAEU are its Councils. 
The Supreme Council (Vysshii sovet) consists of the member states’ heads of state and is 
defined as the highest body of the Union.55 The organisation also has a junior council, the 
Intergovernmental Council (Mezhpravitel’stevennyi sovet), consisting of the heads of 
government.56 Similar to the plenary bodies of other international organisations, these 
Councils meet periodically: at least once or twice a year, respectively. Critically, no departure 
from unanimity takes place in the decision-making process. Decisions are adopted by 
consensus, with no sacrifice of state sovereignty.57 Importantly also, no other body can 
constrain the decisions of the Supreme Council. As pointed out earlier, the plans to set up a 
Parliamentary Assembly within the EAEU never materialised in the face of Kazakhstan’s 
strong opposition.58 The Supreme Council can turn to the Court of the EAEU with a query, 
yet the Court’s consultative opinions have only the status of recommendations.59  
The permanently functioning body of the EAEU, the Eurasian Economic Commission, 
largely inherited the design of its predecessor. As already noted, in 2012 a new Eurasian 
Economic Commission replaced the first Commission of the CU.60 The 2012 Commission 
was modelled on the EU Commission, developed organisational structure consisting of two 
tiers, a Council and a Collegium, and clearly associated with the deepening of the integration 
agenda accompanying the simultaneous launch of the SES. It is noteworthy that it was hailed 
																																								 																				
53 ‘Unified’ policies are only mentioned in Article 1. ‘Obedinit’sia – ne znachit dogovorit’sia’, Kommersant, 12 
February 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2405918; ‘Chto ne ustraivaet Kazakhstan v dogovore o 
Evraziiskom soiuze?’, Radio Azattyq, 25 March 2014, http://rus.azattyq.org/a/evrazijsky-soiuz/25308597.html. 
54 Dragneva, op.cit. note 23. 
55 Article 10 of the EAEU Treaty. 
56 Article 14 of the EAEU Treaty. 
57 Article 13 (2) and Article 17 (2) of the EAEU Treaty. 
58 The September 2013 draft referred to a Eurasian Inter-Parliamentary Assembly modelled on the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community.  
59 Section 98 of Annex 2, Statute of the Court of the EAEU. 
60 Cooper, op.cit. note 27. Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, 18 November 2011.  
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as the first ‘supranational, neutral from the member states body, to which newer and newer 
competences will be transferred’.61  
The EAEU Treaty defines the upper tier of the Commission, the Council, as the body 
providing ‘the general regulation of integration processes as well as the general leadership of 
the activities of the Commission’.62 Indeed, the Council is in charge of the most important 
decisions within the competence of the Commission. As with the higher Councils, the EEC 
Council consists of member states’ representatives, this time at the level of deputy heads of 
government.63 Similarly, this Council adopts its decisions by consensus.64 If no consensus is 
achieved, the decision is referred to the higher councils.  
The lower tier of the Commission is the only body that can be deemed to exhibit 
supranational features. Its members (also called Ministers) must be citizens of the EAEU’s 
member states and are nominated by those member states. Indeed, member states must be 
equally represented within the Collegium.65 Yet the principles of their appointment and 
portfolio allocation provide for some independence from the member states as this act should 
be approved by the highest common body of the EAEU, the Supreme Council. The 
Collegium was envisaged as a developed professional bureaucracy, where the Collegium 
members should have professional qualification and experience suitable to their portfolio.66 
Importantly, the Treaty requires that in exercising their powers Ministers should remain 
independent of the member states which nominated them and cannot seek or receive 
instructions from them.67 Their independence should be underpinned by the fact that they 
cannot be recalled by their member states before the expiry of their 4-year term, except in 
specified circumstances and pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Council.68  
Yet, contrary to the stated intentions, the experience of the 2012 Commission showed that the 
formal regime is not sufficient to guarantee the independent, professional functioning of the 
Collegium. Indeed, this has been an area provoking some of the most vocal criticisms of the 
Commission. The Kazakh President Nazarbayev spoke of the ‘politisation’ of this body, 
protesting particularly against Russia’s influence over ‘its’ Ministers and Commission’s civil 
servants.69 
																																								 																				
61 See President Medvedev’s statement, ‘Vstrecha presidentov Rossii, Republiki Belarus’ I Kazakhstana, 18 
November 2011, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/13581. 
62 Section 22 of the Regulation (Polozhenie) on the Eurasian Economic Commission, Annex 1 to the TEEU 
(‘The EEC Regulation’). 
63 Section 23 of EEC Regulation. 
64 Article 18 (2) of the EAEU Treaty.  
65 According to the latest developments, the Collegium consists of 10 members, that is two from each member 
states, Decision 23 of the Supreme Council, 16 October 2015. 
66 Section 32 of the EEC Regulation. 
67 Section 34 of the EEC Regulation. 
68 Section 41 of the EEC Regulation. 
69 President Nazarbayev referred to the participation of Russia’s Ministers in meetings of the Russian 
government allowing them to receive guidance on specific issues. He also protested about the minimal time 
given to evaluate lengthy drafts prior to their tabling for approval. ‘Kazakhstan nameren vstupit’ v VTO do 




The concern for Russia’s ability to dominate the Commission and its departments, seated in 
Moscow, led to the insistence for additional requirements to prevent undue influence. 
Consequently, the appointment of department heads and their deputies must be done on 
competitive basis, yet also follow the principle of equal member state representation.70 In an 
effort to provide stronger guarantees for independence, an explicit rule was included that the 
civil servants of a Department cannot be members of one and the same member state. The 
appointment of the departments’ staff should also be on competitive basis, yet it can reflect 
the member states’ financial contribution to the Commission, thus potentially allowing for a 
larger Russian representation. As with the Ministers, civil servants and other staff must be 
independent from the EAEU member states.71 Indeed, as an additional precaution, the explicit 
obligation of member states to abstain from seeking to influence the way civil servants might 
fulfil their duties, was inserted.  
Critically, the supranational nature of the Collegium has been best exemplified in its power to 
decide certain issues by qualified majority, where every country (and a country’s Minister) 
carries one vote.72 Thus, there is the formal possibility for a decision to be taken against the 
will of a member state, thereby directly restricting its sovereignty. This change introduced 
with the 2012 Commission and retained in the Treaty, was a departure from the previous 
design of post-Soviet permanent regulators, characterised by weighted voting as the basis for 
distribution of votes, thereby favouring Russia as the strongest state and essentially 
guaranteeing it formal dominance over the regulator’s decision-making.73 The implications of 
qualified majority voting, however, remain highly limited. 
Firstly, qualified majority voting in the Collegium is reserved to routine, non-controversial 
issues. Issues of potential sensitivity are vested with the Council which, as mentioned, 
decides by consensus. Indeed, the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission lists 
130 issues, such as the preparation of draft decisions of the higher Councils, approval of 
changes to import tariffs of sensitive goods, and the adoption of technical standards.74  
Secondly, and most importantly, any member state can request that a decision of the 
Collegium it disagrees with, is repealed or amended.75 This request is initially dealt with by 
the EEC Council, but if no consensus is achieved there, it can be taken to the 
Intergovernmental Council or the Supreme Council.  
Thus, the possibility for qualified majority voting has important domestic constitutional 
implications. However, its significance is easily negated and no country can be bound against 
its will by a decision of the Commission. This is not just with regard to matters deemed as 
‘sensitive’ by the Supreme Council in advance, hence included in the list of issues reserved 
																																								 																				
70 Article 9 (2) of the EAEU Treaty. These civil servants are appointed by the Chairperson of the Collegium for 
a period of 4 years subject to requirements for professional qualification and experience. Tellingly, the 
importance of this provision is underscored by envisaging it in the Treaty itself rather than in the Annex 1 
dealing with the composition and functioning of the Commission. 
71 Section 56 of the EEC Regulation. 
72 Section 21 of the EEC Regulation; Article 18 (2) of the EAEU Treaty. 
73 Dragneva  op.cit. note 23. 
74 Appendix 1 to EEC Regulation. 
75 Section 30 of the EEC Regulation 
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for the Council of the Commission. It applies also on an ad hoc basis even with regard to 
operational, potentially non-controversial issues. In this sense, delegation to the Collegium is 
revocable. Its decisions will stand only when they are accepted ex post by all member states. 
If they are not, the contested issue can be escalated to the highest level of decision-making 
and resolved within the complex context of political bargaining. Unsurprisingly, the 
Collegium’s role has been described as a ‘filter’ and a body proposing drafts for the higher 
bodies, rather than exercising its own decision-making or executive powers.76 
This outcome ensures that the legal constraints which are placed on sovereignty as a result of 
delegation are weak and that the importance of the Collegium as a regulatory body, including 
the efforts to provide formal guarantees for its independence, is diminished. It is noteworthy 
that the description of the 2012 Commission as a ‘supranational body’ has been abandoned in 
the new set-up. Thus, ultimately, the EAEU’s mode of decision-making remains strongly 
intergovernmental as well as centred on the highest level of state authority.  
Common legal order 
The experience of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led to the emergence of a 
‘law of the CIS’.77 Such a law, however, was decidedly a sub-group of international law. 
Furthermore, there was little ‘common’ about it given the variable number of signatories and 
uneven ratification of international agreements.78 The decisions of the CIS principal decision-
making bodies, its Councils, when they were of normative nature, also had the status of 
international agreements and were, thus, subject to ratification or other procedure for 
transformation into domestic law. While subsequent integration frameworks toyed with the 
idea of ‘direct applicability’, ultimately this was purely a declarative notion, an epitome of the 
symbolic emulation of EU-templates.79 The ‘international law’ position was retained within 
the EurAsEC, whereby decisions were deemed to be implemented ‘through the adoption of 
the necessary domestic normative acts in accordance of national legislation’.80  
The design of the Customs Union represented a break in the pattern to the extent that it sought 
to provide an ‘organised’ international law regime. The founding agreement of the CU 
delineated its ‘treaty basis’ to be included in a designated ‘list’ adopted by the Council of 
Head of State.81 The requirement for a ‘block’ adoption of agreements, whereby they enter 
into force simultaneously in all member states, ensured a new level of commonality. Given 
																																								 																				
76 Bail’dinov, op.cit. note 12. 
77 V. Kirilenko and Iu. Mishal’chenko (2001) ‘Pravo Sodrushestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v sisteme 
mezhdunarodnogo prava’. 
78 Dragneva  op.cit. note 40. 
79 Dragneva and Wolczuk  op.cit. note 4. The Treaty on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space of 
26 February 1999 provided for an ‘EU-style decisions’, binding in their entirety and subject to direct 
implementation by the member states. The Agreement on the Legal Guarantees for the Formation of the 
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space of 26 October 1999, however, defined ‘direct implementation’ 
as requiring transformation into domestic law.  
80 Article 14 of the Treaty on the EurAsEC. This view was also upheld in Consultative Ruling Nr 01-1/3-05 of 
the Economic Court of the CIS (sitting as a Court of the EurAsEC) of 10 March 2006, which stated that none of 
the member states’ constitutions provided for an act of international body to be a source of law within these 
countries without an act of domestic transformation.   
81 Protocol on the Procedure for Entry into Force of the International Agreements Directed to Forming the 
Treaty Basis of the Customs Union of 6 October 2007.  
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the incremental fit of the CU within the EurAsEC, however, no special provision was made to 
determine the status of the decisions of the Council. In so far as the rules pertaining to the 
EurAsEC framework continued to apply, formally they still had the status of international 
law. Confusingly, however, despite the important normative contents of some of them, 
Council decisions were not explicitly defined as belonging to the treaty basis of the CU.82  
The status of the decisions of the permanent regulator, the Commission of the CU, however, 
represented a clear departure from the past regime, thus introducing a certain duality in the 
integration regime. The Commission’s decisions were to formally enter into force within a 
month of their official publication and, as of that date, become binding on the member 
states.83 A Decision of the Council of Heads of State defined further that such decisions are 
subject to direct application in the member states of the CU.84 Importantly, it provided that 
their legal force within the domestic systems of the member states will be equivalent to that 
of acts issued by the state organs competent to regulate the issues transferred to the 
Commission. This approach was retained in the design of the 2012 Eurasian Economic 
Commission. Furthermore, the decisions of this Commission were explicitly defined as being 
part of the treaty basis of the CU.85  
As noted previously, from its very inception, the drafting of the EAEU Treaty was linked to 
the effort to codify the legal basis for integration.86 In the short period of existence of the CU 
and SES, the international agreements underpinning them had proliferated. The attempt to 
order this treaty basis by delineating them in a Council-approved ‘list’ was implemented in a 
problematic way.87 Importantly, this solution did not help eliminate the build-up of gaps and 
inconsistencies in the common regime. Ultimately, this was a fragmented regulatory regime 
and its complexity was found to be a key obstacle to realising its potential benefits.88  
The EAEU Treaty delivered on the promise in the sense that it codified (and reworked to 
various degrees) a large number of agreements. This has not necessarily stopped the further 
proliferation of agreements, but has rationalised the legal basis hitherto. Introducing a 
welcome clarity, the Treaty provided that its provisions will prevail over any contradictory 
provisions of such additional agreements, thus asserting its primacy.89 The EAEU Treaty also 
referred to a distinct ‘law of the Union’, consisting of the Treaty, international agreements 
concluded within the Union, international agreements with third parties and the acts of the 
Supreme Council, the Intergovernmental Council and the Eurasian Economic Commission, 
adopted within the scope of their competences.90 Significantly, the Treaty also defined the 
legal hierarchy of the acts of the different bodies, whereby the decisions of the Supreme 
Council prevail over any contradictory decisions of the Intergovernmental Council and the 
																																								 																				
82 Dragneva, op.cit. note 23. 
83 Article Articles 7 and 8 of the Treaty on the Commission of the Customs Union of 6 October 2007. 
84 Decision Nr 15 of the Council of Heads of State of 27 November 2009. 
85 Article 5 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission.  
86 See for example, Decision Nr 21 of the Supreme Eurasian Council of 19 December 2012. 
87 Among other things, the last formally approved list was adopted in November 2009 and, despite the legal 
importance of the list, not updated thereafter, Dragneva, op.cit. note 26. 
88 Interviews with senior officials of the Eurasian Economic Commission, November 2013. 
89 Article 6 (3) of the EAEU Treaty. 
90 Article 6 (4) of the EAEU Treaty. 
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Commission, and the decisions of the Intergovernmental Council prevail over contradictory 
decisions of the Commission.  
Nonetheless, the status of the decisions of the bodies of integration did not change. The legal 
nature of the acts of the Supreme and Intergovernmental Councils remains firmly grounded in 
international law. This outcome was the result of a compromise during the negotiations, 
where another attempt to provide for directly binding acts of the Councils failed in favour of a 
strict intergovernmental solution. Article 7 (2) of the September draft envisaged a general 
provision to the effect that ‘the legal acts of the Union are subject to a binding application, 
have direct effect on the territory of the member states and have priority over the domestic 
legislation of the member states.’ Article 13 (1) of the January 2014 draft, however, sought a 
more nuanced approach and included a Russian proposal to distinguish between EU-style 
decrees (dekrety) defined as explicitly binding on member states, and directives (direktivy) 
defined as providing common objectives to be achieved through the adoption of domestic 
laws, which were also met with opposition. The result was the fall-back to the pre-existing 
solution, with the Treaty stating that their decisions are implemented by the member states in 
the manner provided by national legislation.91 Thus, ultimately, the domestic effect of the 
decisions of the Councils remains determined by the status granted to international law in 
domestic constitutions and laws of treaties.  
Similarly, the Treaty maintains the approach to the Commission’s decisions developed 
previously. These decisions are defined as explicitly ‘binding’ on the member states and 
subject to direct application (neposredstvennoe primenenie) within the territories of the 
member states.92 While the Regulation on the Commission is fairly detailed on the 
organisational aspects of this body, there is nothing on the nature of this direct applicability in 
the context of domestic law. One might assume that, at least in law, the inherited agreement 
on the domestic force of the Commission’s decisions previously reached might stand. Yet, 
this whole area remains unclear and unresolved.  
Thus, the direct applicability of the Commission’s decisions would suggest a sustained move 
towards supranationality with important implications for domestic constitutional 
arrangements. Yet, as with qualified majority voting in the Collegium, the potential effect of 
this provision on the restriction of member states’ sovereignty should not be exaggerated. As 
discussed, any decisions opposed by a member state can be ‘uploaded’ to the higher bodies, 
thereby placed back within the framework of international law. In this sense, the introduction 
of the concept of a ‘law of the Union’ has an organising and symbolic role, but little effect on 
its legal nature. What remains critically important, then, is the domestic treatment of this law. 
It is noteworthy, that during the drafting of the Treaty this was another area of high sensitivity 
and at least Kazakhstan was highly committed to minimising the references to ‘bindingness’ 
and ensuring that the law of the Union cannot have a direct effect, therefore the admission of 
																																								 																				
91 Article 6 (1) of the EAEU Treaty. The Treaty defines a decision (reshenie) as an act of normative nature, 
distinguishing it from resolutions (razporiazheniia ) as acts of organisational and administrative nature, Article 2 
of the EAEU Treaty.   
92 Section 13 of the Regulation on the EEC. 
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the acts of the bodies of integration should firmly remain subject to its own constitutional 
order.93  
Enforceability 
Post-Soviet integration has been characterised by weak disciplinary and enforcement 
mechanisms. Despite the fact that a permanent dispute resolution body was created, the 
Economic Court of the CIS, its design was problematic. Importantly, its rulings were not 
defined as binding; instead, it was provided that ‘the state with respect to which a decision 
was adopted, ensures its implementation.’94 Thus, implementation was a matter of the state’s 
discretion. In the event of non-compliance, the only option for the aggrieved state has been 
turning to the Council of Heads of State, as the highest body of integration.95 Given the 
consensus based mode of decision-making, however, this has meant that decisions can be 
blocked by the unwilling party.  
In effect, very few state disputes were brought before the Court during its existence, 
restricting its primary importance to issuing advisory opinions.96 Ultimately, the rulings of the 
Court in these disputes were predominantly not complied with, resulting in further rounds of 
diplomatic negotiations. The Court itself has over the years become increasingly marginalised 
and paralysed.97 Ultimately, state disputes have been the province of high-level diplomacy 
within the framework of the Council of Heads of State or outside the multilateral framework 
altogether. In the absence of voluntary compliance, traditional bilateral inter-state relations, 
including the use of economic coercion, have prevailed.  
The setting up of the Eurasian Economic Community, despite its greater ambition, did not 
depart from the CIS formula. The EurAsEC Treaty provided for the creation of a dedicated 
Court, yet in practice such a Court was not set up. Instead, the exercise of its competence was 
placed with the Economic Court of the CIS on the basis of a confusing and poorly stitched up 
regime.98 Its rulings were similarly deemed to only recommend measures for implementation, 
supported by the voluntary undertaking that every member state obliges itself to implement 
the decision of the Court issued in a case it is a party to.99  
																																								 																				
93 See, for example, Kazakhstan’s proposal in the January 2014 draft stating that ‘an act of the Union cannot 
repeal or change the national legislation of the member states’, Article 6 (3), which was not retained in the final 
version as a general provision, but clearly explains the compromise reached. The strength of Kazakhstan’s 
sensitivity is evident in that it even objected to the Russian proposal that ‘international treaties representing the 
law of the Union, which have entered into force, become binding on the Union and its member states’, Article 6 
(2).  
94 Article 4 of the Statute of the Economic Court of the CIS, 6 July 1992. 
95 Article 18 of the CIS Charter provides that the Council can ‘recommend to the parties an appropriate 
procedure or method of settling’ the dispute. 
96 R. Dragneva (2017) ‘The Legitimacy of International Trade Tribunals: The Case of Post-Soviet Regional 
Courts’, in Ruiz Fabri, H., Howse, R. and Ulfstein, G. eds., International Trade Tribunals (CUP, Cambridge, 
forthcoming). 
97 Currently, only Russia and Belarus appoint regular judges to the Economic Court of the CIS. While the Court 
has continued issuing certain acts, their legitimacy and legality is highly questionable.   
98 Dragneva, op.cit. note 97. 
99 Article 6 (1) of the Statute of the Court of the EurAsEC, approved by Decision Nr 122 of the Interstate 
Council of EurAsEC, 27 April 2003.  
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The launch of the CU and SES represented a change in this trend in so far as it was 
accompanied by the effort to strengthen the disciplinary and enforcement institutions of 
integration. Notably, after more than a decade, the Court of the EurAsEC was finally set up as 
a dedicated court in 2012. Its revised Statute removed the formula ‘recommended for 
implementation’, explicitly stating that the Court’s decisions are binding (obiazatel’nye dlia 
ispolneniia) on the parties to a dispute.100 This language betrayed a clear attempt to signal a 
higher degree of supranationality of the regime. Yet, the legal meaning of bindingness within 
the domestic legal orders of the member states remained their own constitutional matter. In 
cases of non-compliance, the only remedy at the level of the common regime was turning to 
the Interstate Council. Thus, high-level political bargaining remained the ultimate resort in 
seeking compliance with the Court’s ruling.  
Of further significance were the important enforcement powers granted to the Commission. 
Exhibiting some similarity with its EU counterpart, the 2012 Eurasian Economic Commission 
was given the power to issue notifications informing a member state of the need for 
mandatory compliance. According to Article 20 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic 
Community, if a state failed to comply, the Commission was given the right to lodge a 
complaint with the Court of the EurAsEC.  
Thus, at least on a symbolic level, the regime of the CU and SES suggested a willingness to 
provide for a developed dispute resolution system centred on the Court of the EurAsEC with 
some emulation of the design of the Court of Justice of the EU.101 While, ultimately a 
member state could not be forced to comply against its will, the institutional framework 
seemed to suggest a common commitment to create an effective and legitimate dispute 
resolution body. Certainly, the practice of the Court revealed its efforts to establish itself as an 
authoritative and respected institution, but also to engage in judicial activism emulating its 
EU counter-part.102 
The Treaty of the EAEU opted for the setting up of a Court of the EAEU as a completely new 
body, introducing some changes in the previous regime. Yet, many of these changes 
weakened this body, raising concerns about its independence and the overall effectiveness of 
its role.103 The decisions of the Court were not deemed to be part of the ‘law of the Union’. In 
addition, a special (and somewhat convoluted) provision was inserted to the effect that ‘the 
decision of the Court does not change and/or invalidate any norms of the law of the Union in 
force and the legislation of the member states, nor create new ones.’104 According to 
commentators, this was in direct reaction to the judicial activism shown by the Court of 
																																								 																				
100 Article 20, Statute of the Court of the EurAsEC, approved by Decision Nr 502 of the Interstate Council of 
EurAsEC, 5 July 2010.  
101 A. Ispolinov (2013) ‘Pervye resheniia Suda Evrazes: teoretisheskie I prakticheskie voprosy iurisdiktsii’, 
Rossiiskoe pravosudie Nr 6 (86), 89-101. 
102 This activism was revealed primarily in relation to appeals by commercial actors against the decisions of the 
permanent regulator, the Eurasian Economic Commission, ibid. 
103 Bail’dinov, op.cit. note 12; Karliuk, op.cit. note 12.  
104 Section 102 of the Statute of the Court, Annex 2 of the EAEU Treaty.  
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EvrAsEC, particularly in its Iuzhnii Kuzbass case where it provided a wide interpretation of 
its competences, suggesting the ability to create Union law.105 
Critically, also the disciplinary and enforcement powers of the Commission were reduced. 
While the September 2013 draft reproduced Article 20, placing it at the very beginning of the 
treaty, this provision did not survive in the final version. Thus, currently compliance with 
agreements or decisions remains voluntary, with remedies that can be pursued only through 
the traditional route of inter-state relations. The EAEU Treaty is similarly careful to give a 
wide berth to member states in case consultations and negotiations between them fail. Article 
112 provides that a country can resort to the Court of the EAEU ‘unless an agreement on the 
use of another mechanism is reached’.  
Thus, there has been an effort to minimise the juridicisation of the overall regime, leaving 
member states in full control of the implementation of their undertakings. While the scope of 
integration remains substantial, there is little to ensure that member states will comply with its 
various complex requirements. Ultimately, if the commitment of the leadership of the 
respective country wanes or it fails to deliver on the implementation of the necessary 
domestic measures, the only remedy is the political pressure that might be exerted by its 
peers. 
Conclusion 
The Eurasian Economic Union came into being following a stream of preceding integration 
initiatives. The political narrative around its inception and launch sought to present it as the 
next logical step in the integration process. This advancement of the integration agenda also 
suggested a parallel strengthening of the common regulatory regime, with respective 
implications for the limitation of member states’ sovereignty. Yet, in essence the EAEU is 
less of a supranational framework than its predecessors, offering weak formal constraints to 
state sovereignty and reasserting intergovernmental modes of operation. As this chapter 
demonstrated, this was exhibited in the reduction of the Treaty limits on members’ sovereign 
powers (e.g. the removal of enforcement powers of the Commission), the opaque nature of 
transferred competences (e.g. in relation to many of the common policies), or the lack of 
effective guarantees for upholding the existing limits (e.g. in relation to the acts of the 
Commission or the status of the Court’s decisions).  
Explaining this development and its meaning in comparative regional integration terms 
deserves an extensive treatment, which will be undertaken elsewhere. Yet, it is clear from the 
drafting history of the Treaty that the observed shift is closely related to the eruption of the 
Ukraine crisis. Sovereignty sensitivities have mattered in previous post-Soviet integration 
rounds with important implications for the weakness and poor effectiveness of design.106 In 
the Customs Union format, however, many of these sensitivities were placated or sufficiently 
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offset by the expected benefits of integration.107 Although none of the envisaged limitations 
of sovereignty were absolute, many of the design features of that regime as well as the 
language of integration suggested the transfer of powers to the common framework with 
important domestic constitutional implications, even when these required further attention 
and elaboration. Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, however, security and 
sovereignty concerns were reignited, feeding old sensitivities and prompting new attempts to 
balance the costs and opportunities of integration.108  
The resulting institutional set-up places a huge emphasis on the presence of effective 
domestic constitutional mechanisms to ensure the supremacy of the common regime. Even 
more importantly, progress in integration and the implementation of undertakings are 
critically dependent not on common rules constraining behaviour, but on commitment at the 
highest level of political decision-making. Any limitation of sovereignty is voluntary 
applying not just at the founding of the organisation and endowing it with certain powers and 
rules, but also at every step thereafter: every measure is conditional on the member state’s 
consent and can be revoked.  
Whether an ambitious integration agenda, including large-scale regulatory harmonization, can 
be delivered in this way, remains to be seen. The odds are complicated by the fact that the 
compromise reached with the Treaty of the EEU is not necessarily stable. As President 
Lukashenka pointed out, the Treaty does not offer a satisfactory answer to Belarus’s 
demands.109 While all member states proceeded to ratify the Treaty in a rather uneventful 
manner, ensuring its entry into force on 1 January 2015 as planned, the fragile nature of their 
commitment was laid bare. Amidst continued spats with Russia’s leadership on Kazakh 
statehood, President Nazarbayev asserted the revocability of the commitment made: ‘If the 
rules which were previously established in the treaty are not fulfilled, then Kazakhstan has the 
complete right to end its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Astana will never be 
in an organization which represents a threat to the independence of Kazakhstan.’110 Reading 
such statements, it is not surprising that ‘sovereignty’ is used in relative terms. While the 
traditional notion has become a rarity in the modern interdependent world, post-Westphalian 
sovereignty has exhibited a range of normative, rhetorical and theoretical shades of 
meaning.111 Yet, it is clear that in the Eurasian context the securitisation of sovereignty and 
emphasis on ‘independence’ have become prominent with judgement on economic issues 
following suit.  
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At the same time, the commitment of member states even with regard to core and hitherto 
relatively uncontroversial common competences, such as the Customs Union, has been 
undermined by the nature of Russia’s response to Ukraine’s progress with its Association 
Agreement with the EU. In the absence of a consensus by Belarus and Kazakhstan to support 
the removal of the CU preferential trade regime with Ukraine, Russia elected to proceed 
unilaterally. While such a unilateral course was formally approved by the partners,112 this step 
only underscored the principle of revocability of joint undertakings when a country disagrees 
with a certain course of action and the ultimately intergovernmental nature of the overall 
regime. Subsequent developments related to the similarly unilateral imposition of economic 
sanctions to Ukraine and the EU and the resulting ‘trade wars’ within the EEU, including the 
reintroduction of customs borders, confirm the weakness of the formal arrangements made 
and the relative and symbolic nature of Eurasian integration. It is unsurprising that Russia’s 
partners, to the extent allowed by their economic interdependence, have been keen to 
diversify trade and pursue a more openly multi-vector course. It is also unsurprising that 
Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO has also led to the introduction of a special regime on 
commodities with import tariffs lower than those of the CU, including customs controls 
within the Union and further fragmentation of the common customs regime.113 Thus, despite 
the continued lip-service to an ambitious Eurasian integration agenda with the potential to 
deliver benefits to a market of 180 million people, hegemonic behaviour and limited attention 
to the quality of institutions have so far posed serious concerns about its long-term future.  
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